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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER
TO TAX: ALCO PARKING CORP.
v. PITTSBURGH
Constitutional limitations on the power to tax, especially the use of
the taxing power as a means of regulation, have long been a subject
of dispute with respect to congressional enactments, 1 but are equally
important at the local level. In the case of Alco Parking Corp. v. Pitts-
burgh,2 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was confronted with the
issue of a city's power to impose a relatively high -tax on its competitors
in the municipal parking business. Despite the deference the courts
have traditionally given to the legislature in appraising the fairness of
a tax rate3 and in determining whether a tax legitimately promotes
the general welfare,4 the Pennsylvania court in Alco found the finan-
cial burden imposed by the city of Pittsburgh on its direct competitors
to be confiscatory in violation of the due process clause. The United
States Supreme Court reversed 5 and held ithat burdensome tax rates
and government competition, whether taken separately or together,
are insufficient grounds under the due process clause to invalidate a
tax.6
The parking lot operators on which the city imposed the tax chal-
lenged the tax primarily on the basis of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Pennsylvania court found the tax
to be unconstitutional although it applied the general rule that the due
process clause, as applied to Congress by the Fifth Amendment and
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,7 is a limitation on the power
to tax only "in rare and special instances."8  In employing this stand-
1. E.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1898); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
2. 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4874 (June 10, 1974).
3. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
4. The United States Constitution limits the power to tax by requiring that the
revenue raised be spent for the general welfare. U.S. CNST. art. 1, § 8; United States
v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The decision whether a tax will promote the general
welfare is to be made by the legislative body, not the courts. Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
5. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 42 U.S.L.W. 4874 (June 10, 1974).
6. ld. at 4875.
7. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
8. Id. at 44. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325-28 (1932); Nicols v.
[215]
ard the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertook the difficult task of
clarifying what constitutes a "special instance," a task that has proven
elusive in the past.9 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court's
opinion rejecting the Pennsylvania decision failed to define what con-
stitutes a "special instance" and has thereby left the issue of constitu-
tional restrictions on the power to tax largely unresolved.
The "special instance" found by the Pennsylvania court in the
Alco case was the combination of an excessive tax rate with competi-
tion from the same government authority imposing the tax. In revers-
ing, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the established judi-
cial posture of deference to the legislature in the area of taxation and
repudiated the innovative effort of the Pennsylvania court. This note
will analyze the approach adopted by -the Pennsylvania court in Alco,
especially in relation to its utility as a general rule, and will suggest
guidelines to help the courts in -the difficult task of determining the
constitutional validity of a tax, regardless of the governmental authority
imposing the tax.
Taxation: Revenue or Regulation?
Th power of taxation is exercised to serve one of two basic
goals. First, a tax may be imposed primarily to raise revenue. 10  Sec-
ondly, the purpose motivating a government to levy a tax may be regu-
lation of the taxed subject. Every tax which is not uniformly assessed
has an incidental regulatory effect," because the extraction of a re-
source from the tax subject both decreases the resources available for
pursuing the taxed activity -and provides an incentive to minimize the
tax by either engaging in another activity or by pursuing the taxed
activity in some other manner. Since the extent of this regulatory ef-
fect depends on the rate at which the tax is imposed, the ability to
tax provides the legislature with a powerful regulatory tool.
Chief Justice Marshall's frequently quoted phrase that "the power
Collidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1927); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1916).
9. See, e.g., Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953); Harkness v. United
States, 469 F.2d 310 (Ct. Cl. 1972). But cf. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943).
10. This note will be principally concerned with the use of taxation as a means
of regulation. Although the revenue raising function of taxation is not to be minimized
either in terms of size or importance, the constitutional restraints on this use of the
power have, for the most part, been resolved. E.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509
(1899). See text accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
11. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326
U.S. 340, 362 (1945); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
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to tax involves the power to destroy"12 is indicative of the extent to
which the regulatory effect of taxation may be and has been used by
the legislature. The first major challenge to Congress' power to sup-
press an activity -through taxation arose in the case of Veazie Bank
v. Fenno. 3 Congress had imposed a ten percent tax on any state
bank note in circulation. The purpose of -the tax apparently was to
destroy the state banking currency, 4 not to raise revenue. The Su-
preme Court upheld this use of the taxing power on -the grounds that
since Congress could directly suppress the circulation of the bank notes
under its power to control the national currency, 15 it could use its tax-
ing power as a means to the same end.16 Since the Veazie Bank case,
the courts have continously held -that -the use of the taxing power to
suppress an activity which the legislative body has the power to regu-
late will not meet with judicial interference.'
7
As well as upholding taxes as a means of regulation in areas that
may be constitutionally regulated, some decisions have indicated that
the existence of an independent regulatory power is not a necessary
prerequisite.' 8  The United States Supreme Court retained the Veazie
approach to invalidate congressional taxes until the 1930's when it re-
treated from that 'approach in favor of considering New Deal legisla-
tion on its face without searching for a forbidden regulatory purpose.
In the 1922 case of Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 9 for example,
the Court held unconstitutional -the imposition of a ten percent tax on
the net profits of manufacturers who knowingly employed child labor.
The Court found that the purpose of the tax was to coerce compliance
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). A good ex-
ample of a tax being imposed to discourage an activity was the tax on the transfers
of marihuana. The rate of this tax was $100 per ounce unless the transferee had reg-
istered and paid a special tax. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 1, 68A Stat. 560.
The power to tax may also be used to "keep alive" a favored industry. Nicol v.
Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899). When the regulatory effect of a tax is used as a
protection, it is usually in the context of a tariff to shield domestic industries from
foreign competition. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 427-29
(1940); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411 (1928).
13. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
14. The tax was successful in fulfilling its purpose. It drove the state bank notes
out of circulation within a few years. Citizen's Saving & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka City,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663-64 (1875).
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
16. In these situations the tax is not an exercise of the taxing power per se but
is merely the vehicle through which the desired purpose is attained.
17. E.g., Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969); Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44 (1968); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28
(1953); see Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1973).
18. Compare McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904), with United States
v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
19. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (Child Labor Tax Case).
with a policy deemed desirable by Congress and not to raise revenue.
This use of a tax as a means of implementing social policy was held
to be unconstitutional in this instance because the commerce clause,
as it was then interpreted,20 did not confer upon Congress the power
to regulate manufacturing.
Although -the decision in Bailey was entirely consistent with the
Veazie Bank holding, the underlying theory that regulatory taxation
must be based on a separate regulatory power was particularly inap-
propriate for dealing with the economic problems facing the nation
in the 1930's. By 1933 the nation was caught in the -throes of the
Great Depression, and two important segments of the economy, the
bituminous coal and agriculture industries, were especially depressed.
The Roosevelt administration sought to stimulate these two important
industries through legislation which employed taxation as its means of
accomplishment. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.21 the Supreme Court
held the legislation aimed at relieving the bituminous coal industry's
plight 22 unconstitutional as an attempt to coerce compliance with a
governmental scheme of production beyond congressional authority
under the commerce clause. Similarly, the legislation which sought
to aid agriculture 23 was declared unconstitutional in United States v.
Butler2 4 as lacking a concomitant regulatory power. 25  These deci-
sions, and the legal theory underlying them, frustrated the attempts
of the executive and legislative branches to reverse the course of a
worsening economic crisis. It was in this situation that President
Roosevelt proposed to "reform" the Supreme Court, thereby precipi-
tating "the most acute constitutional crisis in the life of the nation.
-2 6
This proposed "reform" led to the "Constitutional Revolution of
1937" in which the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier restrictive
decisions. In the area of taxation the judicial retreat was accomplished
not by repudiating the holding of Veazie Bank, but by refusing to look
beyond the face of the tax and into its regulatory effect. In Son-
20. At that time neither activities in manufacturing nor production were held to
be in interstate commerce. E.g., Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259-60
(1922).
21. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
22. The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, §§ 1-4, 49 Stat.
991.
23. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, §§ 1-46, 48 Stat. 31.
24. 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
25. These decisions would reach the opposite result under present law because the
regulation of production and manufacture are now considered to be within interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34-37 (1937).
26. F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
FROM 1790 to 1955, at 214 (1955). See generally R. LEE, A HISTORY OF REGULATORY
TAXATION (1973).
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zinsky v. United States27 Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, suc-
cinctly expressed this change when he stated that courts
will not undertake, by collateral inquiry as to the measure of the
regulatory effect of a tax, to ascribe to Congress an attempt, under
the guise of taxation, to exercise another power denied by the Fed-
eral Constitution.
28
This line of reasoning leaves Veazie Bank intact but assures that the
court will rarely question the existence of an underlying power. Be-
cause 'all taxes on their face appear to raise revenue, the requirement
that a regulatory tax be supported by an independent regulatory power
has, in effect, been suspended.
The full extent of -the judicial retreat from examining the consti-
tutional basis for regulatory taxation was expressed in United States
v. Sanchez: 9
It is beyond serious question that a tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters
the activities taxed. The principle applies even though the rev-
enue obtained is obviously negligible, or the revenue purpose of
the tax may be secondary. Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall
because it touches on activities which Congress might not other-
wise regulate.30
Hence the courts looked only to the face of a tax in making the im-
portant threshold determination of whether the tax was a valid exer-
cise of the taxing power for purposes of raising revenue or was an
attempt to employ the power of taxation for purposes of regulation.
"The test of [a tax's] validity is whether on its face the tax operates
as a revenue generating measure and the attendant regulations are in
aid of a revenue purpose."31
The above discussion indicates that the judicial policy of looking
only to the face, and not to the effect, of a tax amounts to considerable
judicial deference to the legislature. This judicial deference is not
based solely on the rather unpleasant experience of 1937 but is also
founded on the recognition that taxation is, as the Supreme Court has
noted, 32 an eminently practical matter, one that involves evaluations
of economics and the business practices employed in this country.
These evalutations can only be properly made with -the aid of resources
and procedural means available to the legislature, not the courts.
Added to the institutional inability of the courts to deal with taxation
specifically is -the general judicial policy of leaving decisions in the eco-
27. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
28. Id. at 514.
29. 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
30. Id. at 44 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1972).
32. Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 516 (1899).
nomic sphere primarily to the legislative bodies.
3
3
Regardless of the wisdom of this position, too much judicial aloof-
ness from the area of taxation is potentially very dangerous to the
functioning of a constitutional scheme of government. Discussing the
erosion of federalism by means of taxation, Justice Frankfurter ob-
served:
To allow what otherwise is excluded from congressional authority
to be brought within it by casting legislation in the form of a rev-
enue measure could ...offer an easy way for the legislative
imagination to control "any one of the great number of subjects
of public interest . . .34
His admonition is equally applicable to the judicial refusal to question
the existence of an underlying regulatory purpose. Given the funda-
mental nature15 and the pervasive power of taxation, failure to look
beyond the face of a tax to recognize infringements on other substan-
tive rights would give legislative bodies the power to pursue forbidden
regulation of constitutionally protected areas.
Taxation and Substantive Constitutional Rights
The Constitution of the United States grants certain basic rights
which may not be interfered with or encroached upon by governmental
activity.3 6 When the government imposes a tax which may impinge
upon a substantive constitutional right, the courts have exhibited a
greater willingness to look beyond the face of the tax to its actual ef-
fect. Illustrative of the scope of judicial review in these cases is the
treatment the courts have given the taxation of the rights to freedom
of religion, speech, and press embodied in the First Amendment. 7 As
to these rights, the courts have held that the imposition of a tax which
serves to discourage their exercise directly is invalid-"
33. E.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 47 (1966);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730 (1963).
34. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (dissenting opinion), over-
ruled on other grounds, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 50-54 (1968).
35. The Supreme Court has described the power to tax as "the one great power
upon which the whole national fabric is based." Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515
(1899). Chief Justice Marshall described the taxing power as "of vital importance;
that it is essential to the existence of government; are truths which it cannot be neces-
sary to re-affirm." Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 561 (1830).
36. The term substantive constitutional rights is here used to refer to those rights
founded in the United States Constitution.
37. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944) (speech); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (religion); Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971)
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When a tax adversely affects a substantive constitutional right, the
courts will invalidate it to the extent of the adverse effect. In Mar-
chetti v. United States,39 for example, the constitutionality of the tax
on gambling was challenged as violative of the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against self-incrimination.40 This tax scheme required
each person engaged in wagering to register with the district collector
of revenue and to pay a tax.4 1  The revenue officers were then re-
quired to submit a registration list to any state or local prosecuting
officer who requested it.42  The Supreme Court held that to the ex-
tent the accused was forced to incriminate himself, the tax was uncon-
stitutional.
A major source of substantive constitutional rights which imposes
limitations on -taxation is the due process clause of -the Fifth Amend-
ment43 applicable to the federal government, and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to
the states. The fact that the vast majority of 'taxes -are not imposed
with absolute uniformity means that taxation is usually based on some
forMn of classification, differentiating one group of people from an-
other.44 For this reason, many taxes are subject to challenge on equal
protection grounds. The restrictions imposed on taxation by the equal
protection clause are dependent upon .the criteria by which the classi-
fication is defined and -the nature of the right affected.
The equal protection clause requires at a minimum that the classi-
fication be rational. The classification must meet this constitutional
standard with respect to both the basis for distinguishing between
(press).
The tax must impinge on the right itself to be violative of the Constitution. See
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). If the manner by which the rights
are exercised becomes commercial or economic in nature the power to tax once again
arises. E.g., Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946); Jones
v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1942).
39. 390 U.S. 39 (1968); accord, Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
40. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . .. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4412.
42. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 756.
Registering and paying the tax were treated as inseparable so that the failure to
do either necessarily subjected the party to the penalty for failure to pay the tax. Mar-
chetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 42-43 & n.3 (1968).
43. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted as im-
posing the mandates of the equal protection clause on the federal government. Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
44. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940); cf. New York Rapid
Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938).
those people included and those people excluded from the class45 and
the relationship between 'the classification and the purpose of the leg-
islation.
4 6
The recent case of Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.47
exemplifies the ease with which the rationality requirement of equal
protection can be met and demonstrates the reluctance of the Court
to look beyond the face of a tax. In Lehnhausen the Supreme Court
upheld a classification that distinguished between corporations and in-
dividuals for purposes of taxation by valuation. The respondent, a
corporation, assailed the classification as lacking any rational basis and
contended that it was therefore violative of equal protection. The
Court noted that the authority imposing the tax has "large leeway in
making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment pro-
duce reasonable systems of taxation. '4 8  The Court then made clear
that the judicial inquiry would not extend beyond the face of the tax:
We could strike down this tax as discriminatory only if we sub-
stituted our judgment on facts of which we can be only dimly
aware for a legislative judgment that reflects a vivid reaction to
pressing fiscal problems.
49
Since the rationality requirement is the only restriction imposed by the
equal protection clause when the legislature is dealing with matters
of economic policy,50 the refusal of the Court to inquire into the basis
of a tax means that the equal protection limitations imposed on most
forms of taxation are minimal.
51
45. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc.
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
-16. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S.
483 (1955). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 341-53 (1949).
47. 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
48. Id. at 359.
49. Id. at 365.
50. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
51. It should be noted that under "new equal protection" the much more stringent
test of compelling state interest is applied if the classification is either suspect or ad-
versely affects a fundamental right. A suspect classification is one that is based on
a trait or element of a class that is an inherently unreasonable basis for distinguishing
one group of people from another. The number of judicially recognized suspect classi-
fications is small. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (sex); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
11 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948) (national ori-
gin).
It is difficult to determine what rights are or are not fundamental other than on
a case by case basis. The United States Supreme Court has attempted to provide a
general guideline by defining those rights which are basic to the "American scheme
of justice" as fundamental. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). See, e.g.,
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55, 561-62 (1964) (suffrage); Skinner v. Okla-
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In A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton52 the Supreme Court restated
the general rule that the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments become a limitation on -the taxing power only in
"rare and special instances." 53 These special instances exist
only if the act be so arbitrary as to compel the conclusion that
it does not involve an exertion of the taxing power, 'but constitutes,
in substance and effect, the direct exertion of a different and for-
'bidden power, as, for example, the confiscation of property.54
The Magnano rule combines the Veazie Bank 'approach, requir-
ing a regulatory tax to be supported by an independent regulatory
power, with the more modem rule that in the economic sphere a court
will defer to the legislature's judgment. Thus, although a tax may
not amount to the exercise of a forbidden power, -the judiciary will
not inquire into the nature of the legislative power being exercised
unless the arbitrariness of the act is patent.55
Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh
In the recent case of Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh5" the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with the difficult task of apply-
ing the special instances rule to a municipally imposed tax. The city
of Pittsburgh had imposed a twenty percent gross receipts tax on all
nonresidential parking garages.57  At the time the ordinance became
effective all nonresidential garages in Pittsburgh were operated either
by private companies or by the city through its Public Parking Au-
thority. Approximately one-quarter of the 24,300 parking spaces in
downtown Pittsburgh were operated by the Parking Authority, the re-
mainder being operated by private interests. 58  The court held this
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage & procreation). This
concept has also been applied in the area of taxation. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote). But see Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (right to travel).
The compelling state interest test is much more difficult to meet than the equal
protection test of rationality employed when the courts review legislation in the eco-
nomic sphere. Indeed, Chief Tustice Burger has questioned whether the test may ever
be met. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
52. 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id.; accord, Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 837 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960);
Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
56. 453 Pa. 245, 307 A.2d 851 (1973) (4-3 decision), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4874
(June 10, 1974).
57. Pittsburgh, Pa., Ordinance 704 §3, December 31, 1969, provided: "A tax for
general revenue purpose is hereby imposed upon all transactions of each operator with
respect to each non-residential parking place, at the rate of 20 per centum (20%) of
the gross receipts from all such transactions received ....
58. Brief for Appellants at 18, Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. at 259,
307 A.2d at 859 (1973).
tax to be confiscatory and thus violative of due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment.5 9
The court found that several aspects combined to bring the tax
within the Magnano special instances rule. First among these factors,
as demonstrated by the destructive effect the tax had on the industry,60
was the excessive tax rate. The effects of the tax rate were aggravated
by the Parking Authority's exemption from real estate taxes and its
ability to obtain financing at much lower interest rates.6 ' The second
important factor was that the private parking lot operators were in di-
rect competition with the Parking Authority. The combined result of
the excessive tax and the competition was to give the Parking Author-
ity a tremendous competitive advantage. If the private operators at-
tempted to preserve their profits by passing the tax on to their cus-
tomers the existing disparity between their rates and the Parking Au-
thority's would grow. 62 Yet if the tax was not passed on, most of the
private operators either would be unable to remain in business or
would show only a minimal return.6' In this situation the competition
from the government prevented the tax from being passed on, so that
the tax served to prevent the use of the property as parking garages.
The court found that this combination of factors constituted a tak-
ing of property without just compensation, and thus qualified as a
59. The court also indicated that the tax may be confiscatory under Pennsylvania
law. Two conditions must be met before a tax becomes confiscatory in Pennsylvania.
First, under the rule of Philadelphia v. Elgin's Garages Inc., 342 Pa. 142, 19 A.2d 845
(1941) the tax must create a situation in which only a few businesses, out of the entire
industry, are able to remain in operation.
The second requirement, established by the court in Philadelphia v. Samuels, 338
Pa. 321, 12 A.2d 79 (1940), is that the tax subject is incapable of passing the tax
on to its customers. The Alco court, however, distinguished Elgin's and Samuels and
based its decision on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Alco Park-
ing Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. at 262, 307 A.2d at 860 (1973).
60. The appellants' statistics demonstrated that with the imposition of the tax 9
of the 14 appellants would suffer operating losses. Brief for Appellants at 18, Alco
Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. at 259, 307 A.2d at 859 (1973).
61. As to the Parking Authority's exemption from real estate taxes, see County
of Allegheny v. Township of Moon, 436 Pa. 54, 258 A.2d 630 (1969); 72 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 5020-204(7) (Supp. 1973); 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 355 (1974).
53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 346 (1974) places a limit of 6 percent per annum on inter-
est paid for Parking Authority bonds, with the exception that for one year the interest
may be greater as determined by the Parking Authority.
62. An attempt to pass the tax on would raise -the appellants' rates from $3.00
to $3.60. While the Parking Authority would have to raise its rates only forty cents,
from $2.00 to $2.40. 453 Pa. at 262, 307 A.2d at 860 (1973).
63. Of the five appellants operating at a gain after the imposition of the tax
Fourth Avenue Parking, Inc. would have the greatest percentage return income of 2.9
percent. Brief for Appellants at 18, Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. at 259,
307 A.2d at 859 (1973),
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"special instance" within the Magnano rule. In making this finding,
the important element taken in conjunction with the burdensome tax
rate"4 was the competition from the city which the court held to have
added "not only a new and most significant dimension to the tradi-
tional constitutional problem of what constitutes a taking without due
process but also an impermissible one. ' 65  In focusing primarily on
the government competition and the excessive tax rate, the court in
Alco made its first departure from the current judicial treatment af-
forded taxes by other courts. By so doing the Pennsylvania court
broke with settled legal precedent regarding burdensome rates of taxa-
tion and government competition, but failed to establish a rule that
might be applied by courts in the future as a standard to test the con-
stitutionality of taxes in general.
Government Competition
There are many situations in which government competition
causes a loss to a private competitor. The judicial treatment given
to complaints that such loss has been suffered may best be illustrated
by examining the several cases which have dealt with the issue.
In Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority6
privately owned utility companies argued that the selling of electricity
by the TVA, a government agency, constituted a taking of their prop-
erty without just compensation. The court noted that the companies
were not protected from competition by either contract or statute, and
denied the companies standing on the grounds that lawful competition,
whether arising from the public or private sector, does not give rise
to a justiciable legal injury.
T
In South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. Chicago65 the appel-
lant, a public utility which operated bus lines, challenged a grant of
federal funds to the Chicago Transit Authority. The appellant argued
that it had standing to challenge the grant on the grounds that the
increase in funds would enable the Transit Authority to expand its
bus lines and thereby to come into competition with the appellant
to the detriment of the appellant's business. The court, specifically
noting that the appellant had no right under state law to be free from
64. Alco Parking Corp. v. Pittsburgh, 453 Pa. at 262, 307 A.2d at 860 (1973).
65. Id. at 269, 307 A.2d at 864.
66. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
67. "Mhe damage consequent on competition, otherwise lawful, is... damnum
absque injuria, and will not support a cause of action or a right to sue." Id. at 140;
see Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1967); cf. Public Service Co.
v. Hamil, 416 F.2d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970).
68. 416 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1969).
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competition, denied the appellant's assertion on the grounds that loss
incident to competition is not legally cognizable.
As illustrated by these two cases, it is clear that competition,
whether it arises from the government or a private party, is of little,
if any, legal significance. The only time competition will be sufficient
to support a legal action is when the party complaining of the injury
has a statutory, common law, or contractual right to be free from com-
petition.
Taxation at Excessive Rates
As the Pennsylvania court in Alco noted, "few, if any courts have
been willing to void a tax solely on the basis of an unreasonably high
rate."60  In cases where the rate of taxation has been brought into
question the judicial deference to the legislature is especially apparent.
In Magnano the Supreme Court noted that the rate of taxation alone,
even though destructive of the tax subject,70 was an insufficient reason
to hold a tax unconstitutional. Subsequent cases have continued to
adhere ,to this position. 1
The reluctance of a court to invalidate a tax on the basis of an
unreasonably high rate is a result of the institutional inability of the
judiciary to review the legislature's judgments on which the tax is
based. When the legislature is considering the rate at which a tax
will be imposed judgments must be made concerning the tax subject,
i.e., the ability of the subject to absorb the tax, the effects on related
interests, etc. These decisions necessitate the use of factual studies
and statistical analyses to ascertain relevant proper factual information
on which to decide whether a tax should be imposed and at what rate.
Collecting and analyzing data of this nature is a function to which leg-
islative bodies, with their investigative capacities, are much better
suited than is the judiciary. Added to this institutional inability is the
judicial recognition 'that it may be the intent of the legislative body,
and entirely within its authority, to destroy the tax subject.12  When
this is the case, judicial interference would only serve -to frustrate a
valid legislative purpose.
69. 453 Pa. at 262, 307 A.2d at 860 (emphasis in original).
70. 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934).
71. See, e.g., Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87 (1935); Nelson Cooney &
Son, Inc. v. Township of South Harrison, 57 N.J. 384, 273 A.2d 33 (1971). But see
Hoffman v. Borough of Neptune City, 137 N.J.L. 485, 60 A.2d 798 (1948).
72. In such a case the proper focus of judicial inquiry should be the extent of
the legislature's regulatory authority and not the rate of taxation.
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Government Competition and Excessive Rates of Taxation Combined
In Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle7 3 the United States
Supreme Court held the combination of government competition and
taxation not to be constitutionally barred. In this case the city of Seat-
tie had imposed a three percent gross receipts tax on the business of
selling and furnishing electric light or power. At the time the tax
was imposed the city was actively and directly competing with the ap-
pellant, a privately owned power and light company. Moreover, the
city, because of -the means used to finance its light and power busi-
ness, 74 was exempt from the tax. The appellant argued that since the
combined power of the city to tax and to compete could be used to
destroy its business the appellant's property had been taken without
due process. The Court expressly found that a government may ac-
tively compete with a private interest at 'the same time it is imposing
a tax upon it and that the risk of loss due to competition was a risk
which the appellant assumed when it entered into business.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in reaching a conclusion op-
posite from that of Puget Sound, raised the question of what constitutes
a "rare and special instance" as contemplated by 'the Magnano rule.
Unfortunately, in so doing, the court failed to establish a general con-
stitutional limitation on the legislature's -power to tax and left its deci-
sion vulnerable to subsequent reversal.
The combination of high rates and government competition is pri-
marily prevented from becoming a general limitation on the power of
taxation by the difficulties encountered in determining whether there
is competition. Competition may generally be defined as the "act of
seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain
at the same time.""6  This definition is useful when the object being
sought is readily identifiable, as it was in Alco, where both parties were
contending for customers of the parking business. However, as the
dissimilarities between the objects being sought or -the manner of
seeking them increases, for example, when one party seeks profit while
another seeks to provide a public service, the definition becomes in-
creasingly inapplicable. Thus, when a situation fits into the commonly
accepted meaning of competition few problems are presented; when
the facts of a situation are oniy partially within the commonly accepted
meaning of the term, the definition begins to fail."6
73. 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
74. Id. at 621-22.
75. BLACK'S LAW DircIONARY 356 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
76. This type of analysis is suggested ,by Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. RlV. 593, 606-15 (1958). But see Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAv. L. RlV. 630, 662-64
(1958).
This problem becomes especially acute when applied to the activ-
ities of the government. The definition of competition would be hard
to apply to the government, because many governmental activities both
compete with private interests and provide useful services to the com-
munity. For example, city owned and operated bus lines provide a
valuable service ,to the, citizens, yet they compete against privately
owned taxi companies.77  Thus, even assuming the facts were such
that a court could confidently find the government to be in competition
with a private interest, there remains the issue of whether the compe-
tition also results in a service to the public and, if so, how a court
should deal with this combination.
When the problems of defining competition, especially govern-
ment competition, are considered along with the institutional inability
of the courts to inquire into the reasonableness of tax rates, it is ap-
parent that the application of the rule developed in the Pennsylvania
decision requires the court to make difficult policy decisions. A court
applying this rule must decide whether the government activity is com-
petitive, whether the tax rate is excessive, and whether these two
taken together impose such a burden on the tax subject as to be vio-
lative of due process. While a court is capable of making most of
these decisions, the nature of the process involved and the rule's re-
quirement that the court balance the results thus obtained against each
other makes it necessary for the court to consider the facts of each
case in such detail that the result could only be predicted in the clear-
est cases.
The United States Supreme Court,78 in reversing the Alco deci-
sion, found that the due process clause neither demanded nor per-
mitted the judiciary to oversee either the burden imposed by a tax
or the existence of government competition.79  The Court also reaf-
firmed the judicial policy of not looking beyond the face of a tax to
infer a legislative attempt to exercise a forbidden power. Unfortu-
nately, the Court, in holding that the combination of a high rate of
taxation with government competition was not a "special instance"
within Magnano, did not choose to elaborate further on what does con-
stitute a "rare and special instance." Thus the result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Alco was only to establish that one situation did
A case which nicely illustrates the difficulties a court may encounter in trying to
define competition is Bretherton v. United Kingdom Totalisator Co., [1945] 1 K.B.
555, 559-60.
77. This example was suggested by New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. City of
New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); cf. Tilton v. Model Taxi Corp., 112 F.2d 86 (2d
Cir. 1940).
78. Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 42 U.S.L.W. 4874, 4876 (June 10, 1974).
79. Id.
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not constitute a special, instance, rather than to further clarify in what
circumstances the power of taxation is constitutionally limited. Had
the parking lot operators alleged, or had the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania based its opinion on, the use of -the -taxing power as an indirect
means of exercising eminent domain the result in the Supreme Court
may have been different. If -these -allegations had been made, the
Court would have been presented not with the issue of the constitu-
tionaity of the effect of a tax but the exercise of a forbidden power
in the guise of a tax.
Constitutional Limitations on Taxation: A Suggested Approach
The Pennsylvania court's decision in Alco represented a break
from the narrowly confined review of ,taxation presently employed by
-the courts. As we have seen, however, the rule developed in the
Pennsylvania decision was necessarily limited by the difficulties of its
application and was subsequently overruled. Nevertheless, the ap-
proach used by the Pennsylvania court in Alco suggests a method of
analysis for courts to employ when reviewing a tax which will give
adequate weight to constitutional provisions protecting against legisla-
tive abuse. The attempt will be made here to clarify and add to -this
method of analysis so as to make it applioable whenever a court is
called upon to review the constitutionality of a tax.
It is important to note at -the outset that every tax may be viewed
as either a revenue raising or a regulatory measure. This distinction
is important because the constitutional limitations imposed depend on
the nature of the tax. If the tax is revenue raising it is, if it is on
the federal level, an enactment based on a specifically enumerated
power;80 if the tax is on the state or local level it is an exercise of
a power inherent in the government's sovereignty. 81 A revenue rais-
ing tax is therefore afforded different constitutional consideration than
a regulatory tax, because the latter lacks either the independent consti-
tutional basis of the former or its status as an inherent attribute of sov-
ereignty.
Since all, taxes may have an inherent regulatory effect,"2 it is nec-
essary to have a means of determining whether a given tax is in fact
revenue raising or regulatory. This determination may be accom-
plished by evaluating several objective aspects of 'the tax in relation
80. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
81. Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953); International Harvester Co. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 444 (1944); Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315
U.S. 657, 660 (1942).
82. Fernandez v. Weiner, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945). See text accompanying
note 9 supra.
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to five general guidelines. First, a tax should be examined in light
of the number of people subjected to it; the greater the number of
people required to pay the tax, -the greater the probability the tax is
for purposes of raising revenue. Second, a court might examine
whether the tax is of the nature that has traditionally been considered
either revenue raising (e.g., income, sales, etc.) or regulatory. Third,
the group taxed should be noted; a tax on individuals would be indica-
tive of a revenue measure, while a tax on a business would tend to
suggest regulation. Fourth, ,the anticipated amount of revenue to be
raised by a tax should be taken into account; the greater the revenue
raised, the greater the likelihood that the tax is revenue raising. Fi-
nally, any statement of purpose by the legislature should be given judi-
cial consideration. The combined conclusions drawn from the above
would provide an indication of the real purpose of the tax involved
and would enable a court to determine the basic nature of the tax
it is reviewing.
If an application of the above criteria results in a determination
that a particular tax is a revenue measure, the tax is subject to rela-
tively few constitutional limitations. 83 Being the exercise of either a
specifically enumerated power or of sovereignty, the legislative use of tax-
ation for raising revenue is limited only by its own terms84 and specific
constitutional provisions, especially those containing rights that may not
be abridged by the exercise of any legislative power. s
The incidental regulatory effect that may be inherent in every
tax is unavoidable and should not be considered when a court reviews
a revenue tax. To give recognition to a revenue tax's unavoidable
regulatory effect would be to confuse revenue raising with regulation.
Such confusion might tie the ability to tax for revenue to the existence
of an independent regulatory power, an unwarranted restriction of the
governmental power to tax for purposes of maintaining itself; or, such
recognition would release regulatory taxation from the requirement of
an independent regulatory power, thereby giving the legislature unfet-
tered power to do by taxation what it could not otherwise accomplish.
If the regulatory effect of a tax is not incidental then the tax itself
is regulatory and other limitations become significant.
If the tax is found to be regulatory the constitutional limitations
on the tax should be recognized so that the legislative body will be
unable to accomplish by taxation what it is unable to accomplish
through the exercise of any other power. This proposed approach to
83. People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184 N.Y. 431, 444 (1906), aff'd, 204 U.S.
152 (1907).
84. See notes 4 & 83 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 37-42 & note 51 supra.
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regulatory taxation compels a retreat from the -present judicial refusal
to ascribe a regulatory intent to the legislature and to look beyond
the face of a .tax.8 6  By almost requiring an express admission that
a tax is regulatory prior to an inquiry into the existence of an inde-
pendent regulatory power, the courts have effectively given unbridled
discretion to the legislature. A return to the requirement that there
be regulatory power separate from the taxing power before taxation
may be used as a means of regulation would once again confine the
power to regulate by taxation to the boundaries contemplated in our
Constitution.
Once it has been determined, by 'applying the above five guide-
lines, that the tax is regulatory the inquiry should be made as to the
existence of an independent regulatory power. If no such power exists
then the tax is invalid as an attempt to exercise a constitutionally pro-
hibited power. If such a power does exist the tax is valid as long
as the regulation by taxation does not extend beyond the -regulation
that could validly be exercised without the use of taxation. For ex-
ample, if an independent power allows regulation but not prohibi-
tion,87 a tax used to effectuate the regulation may not also be prohibi-
tive.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Alco Parking Corp. v.
Pittsburgh departed from the traditional pattern of judicial deference
to the legislature in the area of taxation. In so doing, the court sought
to bring new life to the "special instances" rule enunciated in Magnano
by altering the scope of judicial review. The Pennsylvania court was
willing to look beyond the mere fact that the legislative body imposing
the tax had the power to do so and to examine the reasonableness
of the tax rate. Thus it was willing to examine the actual effects of
the tax in light of constitutional standards.
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the Penn-
sylvania court on the grounds that the judiciary is not the proper body
to supervise the reasonableness of tax rates or to determine the ex-
istence of government competition. The Court, while adhering to the
established judicial deference to the legislature in the area of taxation,
did not delineate a standard to be employed by the courts when re-
86. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
87. Generally if the power to regulate exists, the Court will not strike down a
law that is prohibitory because a less drastic measure is available. The Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as to -the choice between regulation
or prohibition. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Olsen ex rel Western
Reference & Bond Ass'n v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
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viewing the constitutionality of a tax. Although the actual rule laid
down by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was inconsistent with prece-
dent and has been overruled, the court's general analysis suggested
the specific method of analysis outlined in this note to review the
constitutionality of a -tax. This method not only gives recognition to
the reality that government cannot be too strictly constrained when rais-
ing revenue, but also ties the use of taxation for purposes of regula-
tion to the existence of an independent power, thereby preventing the
abuse of the taxing power.
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